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OWNING THE WORLD OF IDEAS 
KEY CONCEPTS AND WHY THEY MATTER SO MUCH TODAY 
1 
KEY CONCEPTS AND WHY THEY MATTER SO 
MUCH TODAY 
Intellectual property (IP) has a history bound up with the rise of capitalism. Intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) extend monopoly control over a range of immaterial things, thereby 
excluding competition and maintaining or increasing profits for the rights holder. In recent 
decades neo-liberal policies have deregulated labour markets while strengthening IPR 
regulation globally. Physical production costs have fallen while value added from IP has risen. 
Market forces are used to discipline labour, but monopolies have developed to protect property 
and in particular IP. By using IPRs to halt competition, prohibitions against ‘legal’ market entry 
(illegal or pirate market entry may still be available) lead to super-profits (profits in excess of 
what a competitive market would afford). This situation makes IP infringement increasingly 
attractive and in some cases the only opportunity for economic participation. 
The formation of today’s global network society was not simply the liberation of culture, 
politics and economics from the ‘dead hand’ of state regulation, whether in the form of western 
Keynesianism or in the form of the former Soviet Union and its satellites. The post–Cold War 
construction of today’s global world has involved a very particular combination of regulation 
and deregulation and is not a ‘natural’ consequence of the end of history or the triumph of the 
free-market. The establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its first act, the 
creation of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), set up a 
very particular ratchet that has been neo-liberal globalization’s governing principle ever since 
– on the one hand, the increased global regulation of IPRs and, on the other, the further global 
deregulation of labour. 
This book seeks to trace this ratchet through the myriad types of IP, the construction of the 
concept of IP itself and how the global ownership of IP may shape our future lives. We will 
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investigate the role of global IPRs in staking out ownership over the world of ideas. The rise 
of the global network society, a concept developed by Manuel Castells, has been accompanied 
by an equal rise in the significance of IPRs as a core set of regulatory principles governing 
human interaction and inequality in a world where information flows through and beyond 
traditional boundaries and formal borders. Yet, it would be a mistake to believe that the rise of 
a network society, where technology makes possible both global connectedness and large-scale 
automation of what was once the greater part of human labour, inevitably led to the greater 
economic valuation of ‘ideas’ relative to ‘physical labour’. This has been a path chosen, and 
yet one that has been challenged and which is not set in stone. In this chapter we lay out the 
basics of IP, what the concept entails and how the paradoxes of a capitalist IP system shape the 
global flow of ideas. 
GLOBAL NETWORK CAPITALISM AND THE TRIPLE 
PARADOX OF  IP 
In today’s global network capitalism, IP has become more fundamental than ever for three 
reasons – the enhanced globalization, digitalization and capitalization of the world – 
themselves the three key elements in today’s global network capitalism. However, each of these 
elements is contradictory to the point of being paradoxical – at least in terms of the significance 
of IP. Through all three of these processes, IP is becoming more significant than ever, yet in 
all three dimensions IP is more seriously hard to control, and is therefore more vulnerable, than 
it has ever been before. 
The Paradox of Globalization for IP: The Transnational Firm, 
Outsourcing and Global Supply Networks  
The neo-liberal form of today’s global network capitalism promotes what Robert Frank and 
Philip Cook (1996) call a ‘winner takes all’ economy. Regulation to protect property is 
combined with deregulation to increase competition between workers. The roll-out of global 
property protection is particularly focused upon enforcement of IPRs beyond borders. This has 
fuelled the growth of global IP monopoly holding firms (the world bestriding transnational 
corporations – TNCs). These companies have ruthlessly outsourced manufacturing across the 
planet to reduce labour and regulation costs. While production is moved elsewhere to be done 
by others, TNCs still claim the right to own the finished product and, in the case of IP-protected 
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goods, the right to be the only ones allowed to sell such products. As such, global deregulation 
of production and regulation of IP offers TNCs the best of both worlds, minimizing costs while 
at the same time maximizing profits by retaining control and excluding competition. A handbag 
designed in London, for example, can now be manufactured in and shipped from China at a 
labour cost only a tiny fraction of the price the trademark-branded object can then command 
back in London (or even in China itself). The same cost reduction and global distribution works 
for medicine, autoparts, cigarettes and clothing. 
Nonetheless, the creation of global trade and production networks challenges the ability of 
IP-rich TNCs to fully control that which they claim to own. Outsourcing might reduce cost and 
legal liability, but it also makes it harder to control the release of unauthorized extra copies 
being made and circulated outside the control of the commissioning corporation. Reduced 
border controls on manufactured goods and the containerization of transportation also increase 
the scope for such overproduction to circulate as widely as authorized products. Foreign direct 
and indirect investment linked to reducing costs and/or outsourcing production also lead to the 
transfer of IP-rich technology that is then reverse-engineered and reproduced illicitly around 
the world. Global flows of technical labour also transfer valuable knowledge beyond IP control. 
While IP evasion is most evident in the copyright field, where file-sharing software allows 
digital copies of content to be freely circulated more efficiently than either IP holders or 
commercial pirates can match (see next section), global supply networks enable making and 
purchase of generic drugs, counterfeit branded goods and even seeds beyond corporate IP 
holder control. 
Thus, IP’s first paradox is that while global trade and production capabilities extend the 
scope of TNCs to reduce costs and expand markets in ideas, at the same time global supply 
networks afford alternative global connections that evade IP controls. 
The Paradox of Digital Networks for IP: Networks of Control Versus 
the Empowered Network Individual 
What Manuel Castells (2000a) calls the rise of the network society combines a technical mode 
of development with a continued capitalist mode of production. Cold War arms spending, state 
welfare expansion, automated manufacturing and international corporate trade expansion 
(noted above) all fuelled the rise of network computing, but digital networks have themselves 
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come to drive forward change in new directions. As Castells (2009, 86) notes, the creation of 
a global digital network media architecture, the collapse of the Soviet Union (and the 
subsequent roll-out of a totalizing capitalist globalization), as well as a new global framework 
for trade and IP (the WTO and its first-born TRIPS), all came together in the formation of 
today’s global network capitalism. International trade, itself a prior driver of network 
development, is also boosted today by the ability not just to coordinate trade globally but to 
distribute production via digital networks. Digital production, coordination and distribution 
reduce costs and expand markets. The reduction of costs is at its most extreme in the realm of 
pure digital goods (software, music, film, television, etc.), but the same market networks for 
digital goods also intensify the control revolution in the production and distribution of patented, 
trademarked and other IP-protected goods. 
The scale of cost reduction and market expansion afforded by the new digital networks is 
staggering, but it has an Achilles’ heel for the globalized economic system. Just as the perfect 
profit storm afforded by global digital networks first hit the music industry in the 1980s with 
the advent of the CD, so it was the music industry that first felt the full force of free digital 
online file-sharing in the late 1990s (David 2010, 2013). The challenge to IP posed by small-
scale actors right down to the level of networked individual consumers has been enhanced and 
globalized. The rising threat of individual consumers has led to a shift in law towards the 
prosecution of individuals for IP infringement. Such individualization is a radical departure. In 
the past the threat of infringement came from commercial actors capable of making the physical 
objects required to use IP content, not the fans, consumers and end-users of that content. 
Today’s IP infringement has been disintermediated. For example, a computer user can copy 
any amount of copyright-rich content without the need to press records or manufacture video 
cassettes, etc. The development of 3D printers (see Rifkin 2014) means that the same 
globalization of individual agency will soon enable internet users to start downloading 
trademark fashions, patented drugs and industrial design objects just as they already download 
or stream music, film television and software. 
The network mode of development is not reducible to network capitalism. Legal monopolies 
have been redrafted and bolstered. However, their technical circumvention continues to 
outmanoeuvre all such attempts to clamp down. What started in music now encompasses the 
whole cultural sector and beyond. The second paradox of IP is that while digital content is 
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formally protected for sale worldwide, digitization also makes content freely available to 
everyone everywhere. 
The Paradox of Capitalism for IP: Property Versus Markets 
The most counterintuitive paradox of IP within today’s global network capitalism is one within 
the supposed essential character of capitalism itself, its synthesis of private property and free-
markets. It may be assumed that property rights and free-markets are essentially compatible 
bedfellows within capitalism. If one person is to sell another person a loaf of bread, it must be 
assumed it is the first person’s to sell, and that the second had no right to take it without paying. 
Property is a necessary condition for market exchange. However, IPRs extend a conception of 
property (one that will be examined in more detail as this book progresses) beyond any 
particular object to the right to make copies of that object (and in the case of IPRs – intangible 
object)  This creates monopolies in the provision of those objects protected, prohibiting 
competition (market entry) and hence enabling higher prices. The extension of property rights 
over the copying of intangible goods is therefore antithetical to the existence of free-markets, 
and limits have almost always been placed upon IPRs accordingly. However, in recent years, 
such limits have been reduced, increasing the significance of the paradox of capitalism in 
relation to IPRs – strong IP suspends markets in the interests of protecting property. 
Colin Crouch (2011, 7) notes the distinction between ‘ordo-liberalism’ (anti-trust regulation 
of mergers to prevent competition leading to the suspension of markets such as when dominant 
players buy up smaller ones and hence create monopoly conditions) and ‘neo-liberalism’ 
(which defends private property even to the extent that unregulated competition allows 
dominant competitors to buy up and/or drive out weaker rivals and hence suspend real market 
conditions). Ordo-liberalism requires authorities to break up monopolies to preserve free-
markets (such as when the US National Football League introduced the ‘draft’ system to ensure 
that successful teams in earlier seasons did not monopolize all the good players in the following 
seasons – perpetuating success but reducing the excitement of the competition). In contrast 
‘neo-liberalism’ promotes – and has been promoted by – the growth of powerful TNCs. Neo-
liberal policies have allowed for the elimination of competition by TNCs, promoting their 
monopoly position with powerful extensions of IP to reduce competition further and, as such, 
prioritizing property over markets for powerful actors even as deregulated labour markets are 
used to further discipline non-property owners. 
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Today’s global network capitalism has adopted the neo-liberal pathway. However, there is 
a catch. IP protection promotes ‘pirate’ markets and anti-capitalist sharing. IP monopolies 
inflate prices and so encourage a pirate capitalism which functions as a shadow-market 
providing consumers with access to IP-protected products at more affordable prices. IPRs also 
encourage forms of ‘anti-capitalist’ sharing, which infringes IPRs not for profit but simply to 
access use-values without their sublimation under exchange-value. Thus, the third paradox is 
that while IP is necessary to maintain scarcity and hence a ‘market’ at least in the sense of ideas 
being sold at all, IP monopolies suspend the free-market itself to defend property rights, but in 
so doing encourage piracy and sharing alternatives. 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF IP IN A GLOBAL NETWORK 
WORLD 
Global tensions regarding the protection, sharing and use of those things covered by IP laws 
abound. Take, for example, recent concerns over patenting genes. While not the first of its kind, 
Myriad Genetics’ 1994 and 1995 patents on genes linked to breast cancer were a global legal 
victory that exemplified the extension of IP from protecting inventions of novel, useful and 
new things to also protecting the ‘discovery’ of natural and already existing processes. While 
the patents were issued in 1994/5, a 2013 US Supreme Court decision revoked Myriad’s BRCA 
gene patents (but not the cDNA patents), thus marking a momentary retreat from the extension 
of IP ownership over the ‘natural’ world (Barraclough 2013). However, even as Myriad lost its 
battle to own the BRCA gene, multiple other living organisms and genetic sequences remain 
patented and thus controlled via IP laws (Leong 2014). 
A second example concerns copyright. The 1998 US Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 
which signed into domestic US law the conditions of the WTO’s TRIPS treaty, criminalized 
the creation and use of any technology that could be used to violate copyright. This anti-
circumvention legislation targets those technologies that have the capacity to unlock the digital 
rights management associated with control of music, open e-books so that blind readers can 
have access to the text and offer methods for users to more freely use their devices. While the 
full impact of anti-circumvention laws has been tempered by ‘dual use’, ‘fair use’ and/or ‘fair 
dealing’ rulings which create ‘safe harbours’ and space for expression, again, IP lobbyists are 
pressing hard to extend, widen and deepen protections and further contain what they claim to 
be unauthorized use of culture. 
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Globally, not all countries have adopted the same attitude towards IP protection. Brazil’s 
2014 legalization of ‘generic’ medicines challenges the global expansion of transnational 
pharmaceutical companies’ IP claims. In the face of resistance, treaties like the highly secretive 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the US and EU, and Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) between the US and East Asia seek to bind states into upholding the 
IPRs of transnational firms, rights that cover a diversity of products from medicines, seeds, 
designer goods, music, books, computer programs and much more. Such transnational treaties, 
negotiated in secret with the interests of industry in clear sight, are designed to bypass 
resistance to the expansion of IP, even if not always successfully. Resistance to IP efforts to 
establish monopoly controls via transnational agreements remain globally significant.  These 
resistances  in the name of citizen rights and access to such things as affordable health care, 
education; the right to participate in cultural life and to freedom of expression present a 
different global approach to development concerns. 
These tensions are at the heart of a world in which information as property has become 
central to the global political economy. The global flow of goods – accompanied by the 
abstraction of property rights so that IP coverage is increasingly extended as the distinctions 
among ‘ideas’, ‘tangible expressions’ and ‘physical carriers’ is diminished, and even more 
importantly the right to reproduce, innovate upon or copy these objects – makes essential a 
global debate over the scope and limitation of IPRs in a free society and culture. 
WHAT ARE IPR’S? 
IP is a social contract, a legal protection extended by society to the holder(s) of such rights. 
This protection affords the holder certain privileges when it comes to using and/or selling 
access to use. IP protection, therefore, constitutes a limitation on use by others such that the 
IPR holder has some degree of monopoly control over that to which the rights pertain. The 
duration of such monopoly controls varied greatly historically and between different forms of 
IP. The extent of control has also varied between states. Recent attempts to ‘harmonize’ such 
differences between national IP regimes have highlighted the significance of IP today as well 
as the significance of the drivers that have pushed for such a global regime (Halbert 1999; May 
2000; Sell 2003; Richards 2004; Gervais 2007, 2014). 
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All rights and laws are social contracts. Ideas of natural justice and claims to ‘find’ universal 
rights that transcend the specific conventions of particular regimes, while potentially ethically 
valid (Held 2010), are only substantiated if enforced by social institutions (Rawls 1971). That 
all rights are social contracts is particularly important to recall in the case of IP, as debates 
about IP get confused when the question of whether IP should be seen as ‘property’ gets raised. 
It is often forgotten that physical ‘property’ is also just a legal (and therefore a social) 
convention. Contemporary debates over IP suggest that a similar erasure of the social 
construction of rights has occurred in this field as well. 
Intellectual? 
What counts as ‘intellectual’ in the case of IPRs? The term intellectual here is used to refer to 
products of the human mind. By product is meant a tangible expression of mental activity, not 
‘an idea’ in abstraction. Copyright covers expressions, not pure ideas; patents cover 
manifestations of invention shown to be useful, original and non-obvious, not speculative 
inventions that cannot be seen to ‘work’; trademarks cover recognizable signs, not general 
symbols, etc. However, the distinctions between an idea and its expression, as between an 
invention and a discovery, or between a specific sign and a generic symbol, are not clear-cut 
and so become the substance of ongoing and significant dispute in courts, legislatures and in 
academic commentary. In addition to its increasing economic significance, temporal extension 
and geographical spread, attempts to widen and deepen the intellectual ‘reach’ of IPRs (what 
gets covered) can be seen as a move towards what we have termed ‘owning the world of ideas’. 
The distinctions between general idea/specific expression, discovery/invention, 
specific/generic signs, etc., are not themselves self-evident. Thus, decisions have to be made 
to balance the danger of offering monopoly control over too much of general culture or the 
natural world against the opposite danger of offering too little incentive to those that would 
create novelty and progress in ‘ideas’. Offering protection to products of the mind seeks to 
afford such products something of the security physical things possess by dint of firstly their 
sheer physical form and secondly the application of the notion of ‘property’ to them (and hence 
the protection of law). Taking an ‘idea’ is easier than taking a table or even a spoon, though 
taking an idea is not the same as removing it, as would be the case if one were to ‘take’ a spoon. 
To take an idea is to copy it, not to remove it. Also, extending property rights to non-things is 
problematic for the same reason it may seem necessary in the first place. If the expression of 
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an idea, of an invention or of a recognizable sign needs protection because it can be so easily 
copied, there is a danger that overly protecting expressions/inventions/signs might itself choke 
off any future creative work/invention/trade. Future works of the mind will almost inevitably 
draw upon and resemble past works. Too long or too extensive a form of protection would 
make all future creativity an act of infringement. 
Strong IP defenders seek to minimize the distinction between idea and expression, between 
discovery and invention and between specific identifiers and generic symbols, signs and 
language itself, so as to extend protection as far ‘up’ into ‘ideas’ as possible (Fuller and 
Lipinska 2014). Strong IP critics (Vaidhyanathan 2003; Lessig 2005) seek to maximize these 
distinctions even to the point of detachment (such that every ‘expression’ is seen as unique and 
hence remains totally ‘free’ within a shared and common culture). The scope of protection 
remains a constant tension underlying the global debate on IP. 
Property? 
Despite claims to the contrary and the general belief that one might be able to assert a property 
right over ideas, IP is not ‘property’ pure and simple. A distinction is drawn between IP and 
physical property. Whereas property rights over a house, a car or a spoon are generally 
‘absolute’ and ‘perpetual’, IPRs are designed to be limited. Ownership in ideas, even when this 
is limited to creative, functional or recognizable manifestations, creates a monopoly in 
‘knowledge’ that inhibits future creativity and thus is not the same as owning a house, a car or 
a spoon. 
Most particularly, IPRs are, with one exception, time-limited. As such, IPRs are manifestly 
balanced ‘social contracts’ between society and creators/inventors. Society extends ‘quasi-
property’ protection to rights holders as a reward/incentive for their efforts. In exchange, the 
creator/inventor’s work eventually becomes the common property of society when the 
protection runs out. This balancing of interests between creator and society makes IPRs more 
obviously ‘social contracts’ than is the case with physical property – where the term ‘private 
property’ emphasises owner rights over the balancing of interests (May and Sell 2006). 
Time-limitedness in IPRs is then distinct from perpetual ownership in physical property. 
However, there are exceptions. Trademarks are perpetual so long as they remain in use, and 
physical property rights are not always absolute and may not always be perpetual, as various 
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environmental, planning/zoning, squatting and adverse possession regulations attest. However, 
historically and in contemporary debates over IP, the question of whether IPRs should or should 
not be perpetual has been and is discussed in terms of whether or not IP should be understood 
as property ‘like any other’. Yet, ‘perpetual’ property rights in things are also a social contract, 
not a natural ‘property’ of things (such as apples having the property of sweetness, or birds 
naturally having the property of flight). All legal protections are ‘social’ contracts. In our 
capitalist societies, perpetual property rights in things have come to be taken as ‘natural’ and 
hence a benchmark against which to measure the seemingly ‘artificial’ construction of less 
absolute rights (Piketty 2014). However, claiming something is a natural right does not make 
it so. As we will discuss in the next chapter, it is precisely in a context where claims that IPRs 
are ‘property’ rights are so readily asserted, taken for granted and assumed to thereby be natural 
that understanding the social nature of both IP and physical property rights is important. 
Rights? 
The terms ‘intellectual’ and ‘property’ stand as totemic symbols within culture and economics 
(Phythian-Adams 2014). Similarly, ‘rights’ carry a sense of absolute, universal and inalienable 
deserts in and by means of politics and law, just as the term ‘property’ stands as an absolute 
for some in the economic domain. Those who hold most to the idea that property ownership 
should be a fundamental human right find absolute claims to other rights (such as to education, 
shelter and asylum) an affront to property rights when taxation is levied on property holders to 
fund these other social rights (Hayek 1946; Friedman 2002). However, Thomas Piketty’s 
(2014) international bestseller advocating global and progressive taxation on wealth and its 
reception indicates a renewed debate over the balance to be struck between property rights and 
other social rights. 
The demand that IPRs should be upheld in countries other than that of the rights holder 
parallels claims that citizens (or stateless persons) should have their rights upheld in, and even 
by, regimes other than their own (Held 2010). This extension is termed ‘national treatment’. 
However, when rights appear to clash as they sometimes do between the variety of property 
and social rights, how might they be balanced? Are some rights inalienable, while others can 
and should be traded/set aside (see Brown 2014)? Advocates of strong IPRs argue that IPRs, 
like physical property rights, should be understood as ‘universal human rights’ alongside 
universal rights such as those to shelter, food, education and free expression (Helfer and Austin 
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2011). If so, all member states of the UN would have an obligation to uphold foreign and 
domestic IPRs just as they are required to shelter refugees, feed the starving and educate 
children. IP critics argue that IPRs are lesser rights than those that warrant access to food, 
medicine and education, and, as such, IPRs may reasonably be limited/suspended if in doing 
so greater fulfilment of ‘higher’ material rights (such as when medical patents are suspended 
in order to supply affordable health care – Halbert 2005, 87–111) and non-material rights (such 
as in accessing educational and cultural resources – Álvarez 2014) is achieved. 
Just as the terms ‘intellectual’ and ‘property’ fail to give the term ‘intellectual property 
rights’ absolute fixity, neither does the term ‘rights’. Rights may or may not be extended to 
cover certain groups for certain entitlements, and rights may or may not be traded, overridden 
or treated as ‘universal’. What has unfolded over time and what currently stands is a balance 
of competing claims and counterclaims made by shifting alliances of social actors. As such, 
just as IPRs are central to maintaining and intensifying contemporary global network 
capitalism, so it is power and resistance within global network society that is key to shaping 
the present and future of IPRs (Halbert 2005; David 2010). 
Who? 
Protecting IPRs is not always the same as protecting the artist/inventor who produced the work. 
IPRs can be ‘alienated’. Authors and musicians sell copyrights to publishers and record labels 
in exchange for royalties. Employers can claim ownership over the innovations of their staff. 
Universities can sell their IPRs to private companies. Over time there has been a consolidation 
of IPRs into corporate hands (Halbert 2014). 
Generally speaking, IPRs are held by individuals who create something new, though the bar 
for creativity in copyright is set quite low. The copyright owner, however, controls the 
reproduction of a copyrighted work and also controls many possible transformative uses of 
their work. So, for example, if a new work of art is ‘substantially similar’ to an already existing 
work, it may be deemed a copyright infringement by the courts. This was the case in the US 
court decision in Rogers v. Koons (1992), where Jeff Koons produced a sculpture based upon 
a postcard he found entitled ‘A String of Puppies’. Despite the fact Koons argued his work was 
transformative, in part because it was a sculpture and not a photograph, and in part because it 
was a parody of American banality, the court found that he had infringed the copyright of the 
photographer. 
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Patents also are designed to protect that which is novel. However, patents especially those 
written broadly may cover a substantial range of possible future products. In patent law, the 
demand for novelty in inventions should prevent possible claims of ownership over aspects of 
the common culture and prior art. Patent law specifically prohibits patents on those inventions 
seen as part of prior art. However, while in theory the public domain should be protected, in 
practice there have been numerous cases where indigenous and traditional community practices 
have been prey to ‘biopiracy/bioprospecting’ and other forms of cultural appropriation. 
Indigenous knowledge in the ‘public domain’ where existing group knowledge is simply 
copied by outsiders with no reward or recognition being ‘paid’ to the originators/custodians of 
that knowledge is one of the political dilemmas created by a capitalist system of IPRs (Shiva 
1997). 
Recent additions to the stable of IPRs include rights over geographical indicators (GIs) and 
other possible mechanisms for protecting traditional knowledge (TK). Such rights are in effect 
assigned to reward custodians for prior innovations and, as such, differ markedly from the 
logic/rationale given for IPRs in general, which is to reward innovation rather than to reward 
preservation. That trademarks can be issued in perpetuity also incentivizes preservation over 
innovation. 
Moves to further extend both copyright and patent terms mean the holder of IPRs is 
increasingly the preserver of old knowledge rather than the creator of new knowledge. 
Minimizing the distinction between expression and idea, and making claims far more generic, 
will also give today’s copyright holder far greater scope to claim future expressions that 
impinge their rights. The same will be true if invention is allowed to further extend into what 
was once deemed discovery, as even the basic building blocks of reality will become subject 
to patent thickets (laying down speculative patent claims on basic knowledge so that future 
developments which have to ‘pass through’ the thicket find themselves having to pay 
substantial ‘rent’). 
Why? 
Laws and rights are social contracts supposedly protecting members of society, however 
defined. Such a contract may be said to reflect natural or divine order, a bulwark against a state 
of nature that would otherwise be ‘nasty, brutish and short’ (Hobbes 2008), or a distortion of 
natural harmony in the interests of powerful actors (Rousseau 2008). The Hobbesian vision of 
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an absolute monarch issuing arbitrary rights, patents and monopolies to favoured subjects and 
others to further the strategic interest of the state describes rather well the world prior to the 
legal formalization of IPRs – which started in the 18th century. 
Regarding the legal formalization of such IPRs, popular rationales refer back to Locke 
(1988) and/or Hegel (1991). For Locke, rights over property extend from the investment of 
labour. Property rights are seen as ‘natural justice’ based upon the effort undertaken to establish 
physical and, by extension, mental properties. For Hegel, less in contrast than in (historical but 
not natural) extension of Locke, ownership rights in ideas should be accorded as a moral 
extension of the creator’s personality (itself – for Hegel – a uniquely modern – but no less 
legitimate for that – recognized identity), a right to be recognized as the creator as indicated by 
the fact the work carries ‘your’ name. 
In Locke’s labour theory, tilling the soil creates a claim to that land (in colonial conditions 
blurring the distinction between discovery and creation – Shiva 1997). Whether developing a 
new plough gives rights over future uses of all such ploughs is less clearly the logical extension 
of Locke’s view because the development of a new plough is contingent upon earlier versions. 
Thus to accommodate these more social aspects of immaterial property, as noted above, some 
form of time limit on ‘ownership’ in ideas might follow, even if Locke’s theory of natural 
justice regarding physical property is typically regarded as warranting perpetual ownership. 
The time limit demarcates the difference between labour spent making a particular physical 
object property (which remains ‘rivalrous’, meaning it cannot be used by others without 
reducing its utility to the first user) and time spent on an idea that – if successful – could be 
used by everyone at the same time – a ‘non-rivalrous’ good. A perpetual monopoly over a ‘non-
rivalrous’ good would create a reward to its inventor so great, and hence a cost to society so 
high, that society might reasonably feel that granting protection over that innovation should 
only be for a fixed term. Otherwise, a perpetual monopoly will force everyone to keep paying 
monopoly rents or remain excluded from accessing the idea. 
It should be noted that interpretations of Locke are divided. Some emphasise Locke’s 
argument for ‘natural justice’ in property ownership based on effort expended and assert that 
such ‘natural justice’ is as true for ideas as for physical products. Such a view sees rights in IP 
as no less a natural and perhaps perpetual right than those over physical things. This extension 
of Locke is typically referred to as the ‘natural rights’ theory in IP. While never absolute, this 
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view has held greater sway with British law makers than with legislators elsewhere. Where this 
view is most strongly held is among IP holders themselves. In contrast to the ‘natural rights’ 
interpretation of Locke when extended to IP, ‘utilitarian’ interpreters of Locke start from his 
attention to the investment made in the creation of things (physical and intellectual) but draw 
a stronger distinction between the potential for individual effort in making specific things and 
the interconnected nature of making mental ‘things’, both in their original creation and in the 
subsequent creation of new ideas thereafter. Utilitarian philosophers (such as Jeremy Bentham 
and John Stuart Mill) accepted Locke’s base theory of property but sought to balance it against 
a defence of markets and the wider distribution of utility. As full property rights over an idea 
would give control of all applications of it, not just the individual and first version (in parallel 
to the making of a singular physical thing), utilitarian theory draws a radical distinction 
between property in physical things and a more limited conception of ownership in immaterial 
things. This utilitarian view was always dominant in the US, and its baseline distinction – such 
that IP be time-limited in most instances to prevent undue concentration of power – is generally 
accepted in law, even while IP holders continue to press (rather self-servingly) for what they 
think are their ‘natural rights’ for perpetual protection. 
The Hegelian personality theory, in contrast, asserts that even if our book is extended a 
limited copyright protection, our names should remain attached to the work even after the 
copyright runs out. The Hegelian ‘moral rights’ model moves beyond simple economic 
considerations of IPRs. Using a Lockean analysis, IPRs are justified because they reward effort 
and/or if they strike the right balance between rewarding past efforts, allowing future 
innovations and enabling maximum utility of new ideas. For Hegel, a creation should always 
be seen as an extension of its creator’s personality and hence carry their name in perpetuity. 
Whether emphasis upon balance or perpetual recognition in IPRs warrant differences over 
limited or perpetual economic control in creations/inventions or whether it is just a distinction 
between economic (payment) and cultural (recognition) as ‘valuation’ is another bone of 
contention. A follower of Rousseau would most likely conclude that all such attempts to 
legislate for who can and cannot use the products of the human mind diminish the common 
culture and simply enforce the interests of dominant actors. 
KEY FORMS, RANGE AND DOMAINS 
What then are the key forms of IP and what do these cover? 
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Copyright protects creative expression, covering textual, visual, musical and other ‘works’ 
(such as computer games and functional software). Copyright does not simply apply to 
‘fictional’ work but protects ‘non-necessary’ form – a photographer’s image of a landscape, or 
a historian’s description of the past. Copyright does not require registration. An expression 
must be fixed in a tangible form, but the law does not require an assessment of quality, only 
that it is the original expression of the author who fixed it. In other words, a copyrighted work 
does not have to be good, but it does have to be unique. 
Moral rights associated with copyright protect the author’s right to be named as author and 
to ensure the work in their name is not corrupted/distorted. Additionally, moral rights may 
mean that creators of works retain a commercial interest in the resale of original works. In 
France, resale of a painting sees the artist receiving a part of the resale value – unlike in, for 
example, the UK. The US does not fully recognize the moral rights of authors, despite 
provisions of the Berne Convention requiring doing so. 
Patent protects ‘inventions’ (although the discovery/invention distinction is as contested as 
the idea/expression distinction is in copyright). Unlike copyright, all patents require 
registration and are ‘granted’ by ‘Patent Offices’ that typically require applications to prove 
the invention meets specific criteria. Specifically, the invention must be non-obvious, novel 
and have utility (‘that’ it works, ‘how’ it works and what ‘use’ it serves). Unlike copyright, 
patent typically assumes ‘progress’ – not just novelty but ‘improvement’. 
Trademark is an IPR protecting brand images, associated logos, signatures, names, sounds, 
etc. Infringement of trademark is a form of counterfeiting – parallel to piracy in relation to 
commercial copyright infringement. Counterfeiting luxury branded goods is just that, while 
counterfeiting medicines and technical products most likely also involves patent infringement. 
Generic drugs however may infringe a patent but not the trademark. Trademarks, unlike other 
IPRs, can be perpetual. 
Trade secrets may or may not be secret but refer to recipes and product particularities that 
would not be sufficiently technical to warrant patent protection, nor sufficiently creative to 
warrant copyright protection. Trade secrets relate to what makes a product distinctive and 
which is ‘recognized’ as stemming from a unique and traditional aspect of a particular maker 
rather than their competitors. The use of this IPR against ‘industrial espionage’ can become 
rife when free access to information is restricted. 
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GIs parallel trademarks but focus on place of origin in relation to the use of certain product 
names. Champagne is the most famous example of a product that can only carry that name if it 
comes from the Champagne region of France. GIs originated in European law and their 
globalization in recent years has been resisted by US corporations that prioritize universal 
copyrights and patents. This tension between IPRs as a defence of tradition and regional 
location against universal corporate ownership via global copyright and patent laws has been 
exacerbated by the extension of GIs as a defence of local, traditional and indigenous knowledge 
(commonly combined in the expression of ‘traditional knowledge’) by and for communities in 
the ‘global south’. 
Plant breeders’ rights refer to IPRs that extend protection to strains of seed that have been 
selectively bred and hybridized. Such rights have allowed breeders to claim ownership over 
seed and hence to try and prevent replanting of seeds harvested from current crops. Such legal 
attempts to control farmers have been combined with more recent attempts to genetically 
engineer patented seed that cannot be replanted, but these things combined to produce a counter 
movement for farmers’ rights which seeks to parallel the extension of rights to TK as noted in 
the previous paragraph. 
Industrial designs cover a wide range of applied arts and manufactured objects deemed 
unsuitable for either copyright or patent on the grounds that ‘designs’ reflect more functional 
necessity than innovation relative to the pure arts or inventions. A chair has a number of 
functional characteristics that largely determine its design. Some countries (UK) offer no 
protection to stylized ‘designer’ furniture manufacturers, while others (Italy) protect ‘style’ 
much more, even in functional objects. 
BINARIES IN DISPUTE 
The notion of IP, then, embodies a number of crucial tensions that will be explored in the 
remainder of this work. These can be summarized as follows: 
Between expression and idea. As has been pointed out, it is more than a purely abstract 
question as to where the distinction between expressions and ideas should be drawn. If 
‘expression’ is loosely understood, such that anything with the look and feel of a prior 
expression could be said to be an infringement, then more control is given to the owner of the 
prior expression. Does, for example, any children’s book about wizard schools infringe on 
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Harry Potter? A strong demarcation between idea and expression, one which could make any 
difference between two manifestations of an idea sufficient to establish an independent 
copyright claim, would leave every expression unique and hence immune to claims to be 
infringing. Similarly, when designer labels use particular colours and words in association with 
their product, at what point does such visual content become ‘theirs’? While drawing a line 
between where an idea ends and a specific expression begins can be problematic, abolishing 
the idea/expression distinction could allow the full ownership of the world of ideas to become 
a reality, which would be equally problematic. As such, you could not ‘Just do it’. 
Between invention and discovery. If an invention allows use of already existing, but 
previously invisible, objects, where does ownership end? Should the inventor just own the 
technique used to ‘discover’ these naturally occurring objects? Or, should ownership extend 
over the objects themselves? Whereas in the macro-world of continents and forests the 
invention/discovery distinction has been robustly maintained (in IP law at least – if not when 
modern farming techniques ideologically excused colonial land theft), in the micro-world of 
particles, genes and bacteria, recent legal decisions have fundamentally blurred this distinction. 
Rather, in parallel with owning ‘ideas’ through the undoing of the idea/expression dichotomy, 
patenting microorganisms makes it possible for IPRs to flow ‘upstream’ from the specific 
invention to the source – reality itself. Rights holders could own the world via owning ideas as 
manifested in naturally occurring objects that were previously unpatentable. Everyone else 
must now pay rent to stand on the shoulders of such giants. 
Between monopoly and free-markets. While a capitalist society combines property 
ownership and free-markets, the two are not necessarily aligned. The promotion of free-
markets requires regulation of monopolies, but protection of IPRs requires restriction on market 
entry through regulation of ‘free’ copying. IP protects non-rivalrous goods – those that have 
no natural scarcity because an expression/invention can be used by an infinite number of people 
at the same time without diminishing its functional utility. Free access to such non-rivalrous 
goods, however, would undermine the exchange value of such goods and so supplies must be 
limited to maintain a price. IPRs represent a suspension of free-markets in favour of 
monopolies in the interest of rewarding rights holders who it is assumed were motivated to 
innovate because they would be granted such monopoly rights. Such a control of markets may 
require additional interventions to prevent these monopolies from overly exploiting the 
suspension of competition. Free-market ‘pirates’ are a threat to IP concentration – to put it 
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another way, such pirates bring lower prices to consumers labouring under the yoke of 
monopoly rents. Perpetual IPRs would indefinitely suspend markets and uphold IP at the 
expense of free-market competition. Imposing time-limits to monopolies reintroduces a 
possible ground for markets, but if IPRs are totally suspended then the benefits of property 
protection in enabling free-market entry may also be disrupted. 
Between creators and the wider society. IPRs give protection to immaterial things that might 
otherwise be copied easily without limit. However, the vulnerability of immaterial goods – 
their ability to be replicated widely – which is said to warrant IPR protection is also what makes 
such protection so valuable (and potentially dangerous) if it could be achieved. The lock on 
your door protects far less than could be gained from owning rights over lock mechanisms in 
general. 
Attempts to collapse IP into property in general (by whittling away at limits) parallel 
attempts to extend protection of expression closer and closer to basic ideas, collapsing 
discovery into invention and the neo-liberal prioritizing of corporate monopoly rights over 
price-regulating (i.e. genuinely competitive) markets (Crouch 2004, 2011). While IPRs are a 
social contract like any other property right, particular attention has been paid to the need to 
regulate rights over immaterial things because their unlimited extension (in time) would be so 
costly to the wider society (an unlimited monopoly on something that itself has no natural limits 
in its replication). 
CONCLUSIONS 
Global network capitalism is characterized by global flows and the transition from the primacy 
of physical goods to informational content as the key to value-adding profitability. As such, 
global deregulation of markets and global regulation of IPRs stand as the two reinforcing, if 
also contradictory, pillars of our current world order. The increased economic value of 
immaterial content, which parallels the devaluation of increasingly automated and 
interchangeable products and processes of production, is no natural effect of any ‘post-
industrial’ or ‘globalizing’ logic as such. Technical automation could see immaterial content’s 
economic value decline alongside, if not more rapidly than, the price of automated physical 
goods. Automation can just as (if not more) easily mass-produce films, music, chemical 
formulae and computer games as it can produce the cameras, CD players, bottles and consoles 
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that might contain them (and very much does so). Fully deregulated global flows would see 
immaterial goods sold at free-market prices, prices which might well be very little indeed, if 
the same forces of deregulation as applied to labour markets and production regimes worldwide 
were applied to products of the mind. To some degree such free-market pricing happens in the 
form of free (but copyright infringing) file-sharing and live-streaming.  It can also be found in 
trademark and patent infringing markets for ‘knock off’ designer goods, generic and counterfeit 
medicines etc. However, to the extent global network capitalism can remain dominant, it does 
so through the global regulation of property, including IP, while deregulating labour rights and 
global production networks. IPRs and their global enforcement are central to the ongoing 
domination of global network capitalism. 
IPRs are social conventions that regulate access and use of the products of the human mind 
to promote/balance particular interests and must be studied as such. IPRs cover a range of 
immaterial content (from songs and stories to drugs and seeds). They take a number of forms 
(from copyright and trademarks to patents and breeders’ rights). Their form, coverage and 
duration vary (between types, countries and across the years). In addition, finally, the rationales 
put forward to justify their existence, form and coverage are both divergent and contested. This 
chapter has sought to show that the very elements of the term itself, the notions of ‘intellectual’, 
‘property’ and ‘rights’, are sites of dispute, not the foundations of any clear and natural basis 
for compelling assent to any particular regime. The centrality of IPRs in the global regulation 
of property, even while labour and production are deregulated, and the attempts by corporate 
lobbies and pliant states to present IPRs as naturally universal and absolute make it all the more 
necessary to bring such misrepresentations into question. 
Where the boundary lies between expression and idea, between invention and discovery and 
between monopoly property rights in providing certain goods and the role of markets in 
allowing new entrants and price competition is neither natural nor necessary. Global network 
capitalism itself is riddled with both contradiction and resistance: between protecting property 
and promoting competition, between expanding markets via global networks and shoring up 
such channels against their alternative uses as conduits for highly ‘efficient’ free-sharing, and 
between an increasingly global regulation regime and the capacity of networked individuals to 
bypass both corporate intermediaries and harmonized regimes of control. 
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Chapter 2, on the history and globalization of IPRs in general, will develop this 
‘denaturalization’ account. Chapters 3 (copyright), 4 (patents) and 5 (trademarks, GIs and 
design rights) will explore in more detail the specifics of ongoing disputes in these fields. In 
each case IPRs are shown to be central to contemporary global network capitalism’s attempts 
to regulate property while deregulating labour rights and production regimes. However, at the 
same time each chapter highlights resistance to and contradiction within such attempts at 
‘owning the world of ideas’. 
As this book will set out, since the end of the Cold War and through the creation of WTO 
and TRIPS, a new neo-liberal framework for global network capitalism started to be put in 
place. At the core of this new regime has been increased regulation (protection) of IP and 
decreased regulation (a reduction in protection) for labour. IP extension in duration, depth and 
geographical reach has been at the heart of all this, yet global circulation of people and ideas 
challenges IP control even as it also offers potential for greater profit. Digital networks 
similarly cut both ways, and protecting IP itself undermines free-market principles even while 
it does encourage unprincipled ‘pirate’ capitalism and anti-market sharing. 
Just as the reality of global IP extension is fragile and contradictory, so also is the supposed 
justification for having IP protection at all. This book will highlight the weakness of claims 
that IP protection actually incentivizes invention and creativity more than it prohibits them and 
challenge the IP protectionists’ argument that strong IP delivers maximum utility (overall 
benefits), an open and free culture, fair access to medicines, development enabling technology 
and/or environmentally friendly technology transfer. 
As such, while significant elements of a global IP regime have been put in place, this regime 
is neither secure in practice nor defensible in principle. While IP protectionist lobbies remain 
well-resourced and influential players in business circles, the corridors of state and within 
international and global forums, resistance too is strong and growing, within both formal 
institutional arenas and in the alternative practices of those who simply bypass IP in their 
everyday sharing and purchasing. 
Efforts at further roll-out of IP extension – in time, space and depth – continue, but such 
efforts have experienced significant opposition and have in some cases been defeated – at least 
in the short term. Beyond simply preventing further roll-out, some instances of roll-back have 
been achieved. Suspension and even abolition of IP in particular places and cases has also taken 
21 
 
place (such as with generic drug licencing for essential medicines by some developing 
countries). One final scenario, prefigured in the everyday practices of many millions, is simply 
the withering relevance of ‘global’ laws in actually regulating the everyday lives of most 
people, not so much abolishing overextended legal protectionism but rather ignoring its claims 
– and being able to ignore them when such laws cannot be enforced. In this scenario claiming 
the right to own the world of ideas is just a very extreme case of global hubris. King Canute 
may have ordered the tide not to come in just to show that his law really did not govern reality. 
Our rulers appear to have no such modesty. Claiming to own the world of ideas they appear 
not to have noticed that their feet are getting wet, or if they have noticed they still believe they 
have the right and power to command that the tide turns back. 
 
